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There is a burgeoning debate on the relationship between current account imbalances and
the global ￿nancial meltdown (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2009, ECB, 2010, Chinn, 2011). Even
before the ￿nancial crisis in 2008, some leading economists such as Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2005), Eichengreen (2006), Frankel (2006) Krugman, (2007) and Williamson (2007) warned
about the risks from global imbalances; they felt that the trigger might be a sizeable de-
valuation of the dollar. In the event, as underlined by Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009)
and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2009), ￿nancial instability spread from the United States to the
rest of the world mostly through ￿nancial interlinkages among highly leveraged institutions,
as increased defaults in the US subprime market undermined securitized products. The
freezing of the interbank market and the failure of systemically large institutions caused an
unprecedented loss of con￿dence, which partially explained the subsequent collapse in global
output and trade. The impact on the balance sheets of banks, corporations and the public
sector weakened con￿dence still further, leading to a vicious circle that is entirely typical
of ￿nancial crises but this time a⁄ected the core of the global ￿nancial system (Krugman,
2009).
Given this background, the renewed interest in current account imbalances is hardly
surprising. The standard starting point in analyzing current accounts is the intertemporal
approach which originated with Sachs (1981), and was later extended by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(1994). Empirical studies on the intertemporal approach to the current account have been
carried out by She⁄rin and Woo (1990), Otto (1992), Milbourne and Otto (1992), Otto and
Voss (1995), Bergin (2006) and many others. Typically though, the simple intertemporal
current account models have a poor empirical ￿t. Partly to address this issue, the basic
intertemporal model has been extended in many directions. Several papers show the im-
portance of introducing additional factors that could a⁄ect consumption / savings decisions:
BussiŁre et al. (2006) extend the intertemporal model to include the role of ￿scal policy; Gal￿
et al. (2007) assume a fraction of households cannot optimize intertemporally, for example
if they have no access to capital markets. Some researchers consider the impact of changing
international conditions, assuming variable interest rates and exchanges rates (Bergin and
She⁄rin, 2000), while others allow for endogenous investment (Glick and Rogo⁄ 1995). In
the context of common currency areas, Ca￿Zorzi and Rubaszek (2008) argue that a sim-
ple intertemporal model, which includes net foreign assets, ￿nancing costs and expectations
of economic convergence, helps explain the con￿guration of current account developments
in the euro area before the ￿nancial turmoil. Finally, demographic factors could also be
included in structural models, for example in an overlapping generations framework.
It is clear that the various structural models could potentially produce very di⁄erent
1predictions on the relevant current account determinants, and there is a growing empirical
literature that includes many of the drivers of current account positions suggested from
di⁄erent theoretical approaches; examples include Chinn and Prasad (2003), IMF (2006) and
Rahman (2008). The robustness of the derived results is typically addressed by considering
the homogeneity of the elasticities across di⁄erent groupings of countries or by employing
di⁄erent estimation techniques.
The literature on current account imbalances has however largely ignored an important
source of uncertainty. The set of plausible fundamentals determining the current account
allows for thousands, or millions, of possible model combinations. It appears arbitrary to
choose only one model unless there is a transparent selection procedure. The main contri-
bution of this paper is to investigate the importance of model and parameter uncertainty
before reaching any ￿rm conclusions on the current account constellation which prevailed
before the ￿nancial crisis. We look for clear cut conclusions by following di⁄erent routes
corresponding to three plausible econometric strategies. The ￿rst route consists in examining
all models and checking if common features can be identi￿ed across all of them. The second
route aims at choosing the best model, using a transparent selection procedure based on
both economic and statistical criteria. The third and ￿nal route applies Bayesian techniques
developed by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) to assess the probability of each model and also
employs model combination techniques. The analysis is then taken a step further by calcu-
lating the probability of the current account position of any given country being misaligned.
All three approaches allow us to assess whether there is evidence of imbalances in major
economies, such as the US, the United Kingdom, China and Japan.1 Out of thousands or
indeed millions of models, one consistent story emerges: the chance that current accounts
were aligned with fundamentals prior to the ￿nancial crisis appears to be, according to this
approach, minimal.
2 Potential Determinants of Current Accounts
Before going on to explain our estimation approach, we will ￿rst identify the main medium-
term determinants of current account de￿cits. Our objective is to provide an empirical,
although not entirely atheoretical, characterization of current account determinants. Indeed,
we use a variety of theoretical models to drive our estimation strategy and to provide guidance
on the expected sign of the coe¢ cients. In particular, we build upon the work of Debelle and
Faruqee (1996), Calderon et al. (2002), Chinn and Prasad (2003), Doisy and HervØ (2003),
BussiŁre et al. (2006), Zanghieri (2004), Gruber and Kamin (2005), Hermann and Jochem
(2005), Aristovnik (2006), IMF (2006), De Santis and L￿hrmann (2008), and Rahman (2008).
1For an out of sample analysis of central and eastern European countries, see Ca￿Zorzi et al. (2011).
2We start by outlining the main determinants of medium-term current account variation as
identi￿ed by the above literature and the suggested theoretical priors for the expected signs.
Later we also evaluate the impact of extending the set of plausible fundamentals even further.
The following variables are not constructed relative to foreign trading partners, because
this is implicit in their de￿nition.
￿ ￿ Initial￿net foreign assets (NFA), as a share of GDP. Economies characterized
by high levels of indebtedness (i.e. negative NFA) are expected eventually to improve
their current account position to preserve long-term solvency, suggesting a negative
association. On the other hand, highly indebted countries typically record negative
income ￿ ows, which weigh negatively on the current account. The sign is ambiguous.
￿ Oil balance. There is a positive co-movement between the oil balance position of a
country and its current account. In the literature this variable is used to proxy the
sensitivity of a country to changes in oil prices.
In contrast, the following determinants are constructed as deviations from the weighted
averages of foreign trading partners:
￿ Investment as a share of GDP. Current investment should lead to productivity gains
in the future, and hence higher expected wealth, giving rise to an intertemporal adjust-
ment which results in a current account de￿cit (Glick and Rogo⁄, 1995). Furthermore,
an increase in a demand variable, such as investment, is associated with a worsening
of the foreign trade balance. A negative sign is expected.
￿ Real GDP growth. The higher real GDP growth, the more likely workers are to
project higher future income and to respond by increasing consumption. Consequently,
a negative sign is expected.
￿ Fiscal balance. A variety of models (excluding those based on Ricardian equivalence)
predict a positive relationship between government budget balances and current ac-
counts over the medium term. For example, overlapping generations models suggest
that government budget de￿cits tend to induce current account de￿cits by redistribut-
ing income from future to present generations (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1994 and Chinn,
2005). BussiŁre et al. (2006) also found there was a connection between ￿scal de￿cits
and the current account (in line with the ￿twin de￿cits￿idea). A positive coe¢ cient
is therefore expected.
￿ Relative income. Low-income countries are expected to have larger current account
de￿cits as part of the catching-up process. Hence a positive coe¢ cient is expected.
Our measure is real GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).
3￿ Demographic variables. A country with a relatively high share of economic depen-
dents in the population is expected to have a lower level of national savings and hence
a lower current account balance (IMF, 2006). As this depends on the proportion of the
dependent population that is young or old, we include the following three variables:
￿An old-age dependency ratio constructed as the ratio of people older than 65
years to the population aged between 14 and 65.
￿A youth dependency ratio constructed as the ratio of young people (under 14)
to the population aged between 14 and 65.
￿Population growth.
Negative signs are expected for these variables.
￿ Civil liberties. Legal rights, functioning markets and e¢ cient institutions should all
ease access to international capital markets (De Santis and L￿hrmann, 2008). This is
measured using an index from 1 (maximum degree of liberty) to 7 (minimum degree
of liberty). A positive sign is expected.
￿ Trade integration is measured as the degree of openness relative to GDP. Openness
is also commonly used in the literature as a proxy for barriers to trade (or even trade
costs). The sign of the coe¢ cient is ambiguous.
￿ Financial integration is de￿ned as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a share
of GDP. This gives us a measure of the sophistication and internationalization of the
￿nancial system. The argument is that a well developed ￿nancial system should induce
more savings because higher returns are expected. On the other hand, it could also
signal fewer borrowing constraints and therefore less savings. The e⁄ects on domestic
investment are also not clear from a theoretical perspective. We therefore take the sign
of the coe¢ cient to be ambiguous.
￿ Relative income squared allows for non-linearity between relative per-capita income
and current account positions (Chinn and Prasad, 2003). This is consistent with low-
income countries having little access to international capital markets, in contrast to
countries in the middle stage of development. The sign of the coe¢ cient is ambiguous.
￿ Asian crisis dummy. We introduce a dummy for the Asian countries, starting in
1998 and re￿ ecting a possible structural break resulting from the impact of the ￿nancial
turmoil in Asia (IMF, 2006, and Rahman, 2008).
42.1 Data
We have constructed data on these 14 potential current account determinants. It is possible
that only a subset of the fundamentals is relevant and we let the empirical analysis decide
which are the most important determinants for the countries in the panel.2 Our main source
of data is the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (September 2008 version),
which provides us with data from 1980 to 2013. The time dimension thus starts in 1980,
with 181 countries featuring in the WEO database. The World Development Indicators
(WDI) database is used for demographic variables other than population growth, which is
taken from WEO. The data on bilateral trade are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS) database. Average foreign trade ￿ ows during the 1996-2000 period are
used to compute country-speci￿c weighted averages of foreign variables. Out of 181 countries,
172 have data on current account balances (as a percentage of GDP) over the whole of the
sample period. As regards outliers, we exclude all countries with current account de￿cits
larger than 50% at any point in time and we also exclude those countries that observed
changes in the current account larger than 30% of GDP from one year to the next.
For the regressions, the time and group dimension of the panel has been selected on the
basis of data availability. The minimum dimensions for which all variables are available is
N = 77 and T = 25. Table A.1 in the Appendix describes these variables in greater detail.
3 Estimation Techniques
Let current account as a share of GDP in country i and period t, denoted by cait, be generated
as:








i;t￿‘￿i‘ + ￿it, (1)
where i 2 f1;::;Ng, t 2 f1;::;Tg, xit is a k￿1 dimensional vector of fundamentals for coun-
try i in period t and ￿it is the error term, which is serially uncorrelated as well as uncorrelated
with regressors such that E (￿itxit) = 0. Model (1) is a general dynamic model of current
account that allows for considerable heterogeneity, both across countries via individual ￿xed
e⁄ects ￿i, and, more importantly, via country-speci￿c dynamics through heterogenous coef-
￿cients fbi‘g and f￿i‘g. We assume the level relationship between current account and the
set of fundamentals is homogenous; in other words that the k￿1 dimensional vector of level
2We further expand this list of fundamentals, at the cost of country coverage in the sensitivity analysis.
5elasticities, denoted by ￿i, is the same across countries






for any i 2 f1;::;Ng. (2)
The level elasticities ￿ are the object of our estimations and there are a number of di⁄erent
approaches in the literature to estimate ￿ which depend on the way short-run dynamics are
dealt with. Broadly speaking, the econometric techniques can be divided into two groups:
(i) static models (where bi‘ = 0 and ￿i‘ = 0 for ‘ > 0) and (ii) dynamic models. We brie￿ y
review the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches below.
One of the major constraints in estimating the level relationship between current account
and a set of fundamentals is the relatively limited number of (annual) time observations
(sometimes as small as T = 10), while the number of countries is relatively large, often close
to a hundred. Data constraints are naturally re￿ ected in the choice of techniques used to
estimate the level relationship. The simple pooled least squares estimator su⁄ers from a
short sample bias of order O(T ￿1) in the presence of ￿xed e⁄ects and it is therefore typically
not used in a dynamic set-up. Commonly employed estimators of dynamic current account
equations are instrumental variable (IV) estimation in ￿rst di⁄erences (Anderson and Hsiao,
1982), and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. The former (IV) is a valid
estimator of (assumed) homogenous parameters under asymptotics N;T ! 1 (i.e. large N
and T), while the later (GMM) is valid for ￿xed T and N ! 1. Because of the relatively
short time span of the available data, GMM techniques are commonly preferred.3 Examples
of this approach include BussiŁre et al. (2006), who estimate current account benchmarks
for a panel of 33 countries, including ten central and eastern European countries.
The major drawback of ￿xed T and large N estimations is that they assume homogeneity
not only for the level elasticities ￿, but also for all individual coe¢ cients bi‘ = b‘ and ￿i‘ = ￿‘
for i = 1;:::;N. This assumption is very unlikely to hold in practice. As shown by Pesaran
and Smith (1995), in the dynamic case where the coe¢ cients di⁄er across groups pooling gives
inconsistent and potentially highly misleading estimates of the homogenous level elasticities
￿. This is also true for pooled static models, which ignore dynamics altogether.
A compromise between ￿pure￿ static models and dynamic models is to ￿lter high-
frequency movements by means of m-year non-overlapping moving averages and then es-
3It is useful to distinguish between the ￿standard￿ GMM estimators proposed by Holtz-Eakin (1988)
and Arellano and Bond (1991) and their subsequent extensions by, for example, Ahn and Schmidt (1995),
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The ￿standard￿GMM estimators are based on
orthogonality conditions that interact the lagged values of the endogenous variables with ￿rst di⁄erences of
the model￿ s disturbances, whereas the ￿extended￿GMM estimators augment these orthogonality conditions
with additional moment conditions implied by homoskedasticity and initialization restrictions. More recently,
Binder et al. (2005) developed GMM and QML estimators for panel VARs (￿xed T and N ! 1) where it
is not known whether series are stationary or I (1) and possibly cointegrated.
6timate a static relationship between the ￿ltered variables. As shown by Pesaran and Smith
(1995), ￿ltering the short-run dynamics by constructing non-overlapping moving averages
mitigates the bias which arises if the individual country dynamics are ignored. The bias
for the inference on level elasticities ￿ is of order O(1=m), and where m;N ! 1, we have
consistent estimates. Pesaran and Smith (1995) explicitly consider the case where m = T
and T;N ! 1, that is to say a cross-sectional regression on the data averaged over time.4
In view of both the above-mentioned advantages and disadvantages, and the possibility of
signi￿cant measurement errors in low frequency data, and since our focus is on medium-term
developments in current accounts, we decided to ￿lter the data ￿rst by constructing non-
overlapping time averages and then applying simple pooled OLS.5 By using this approach
we are abstracting from factors that are purely cyclical or temporary.6 For the baseline we
chose m = 12; which means we average the 25 year period into 2 observations per variable.
However, later in the analysis we check the sensitivity of estimations using di⁄erent choices
of m.
3.1 Model selection
Having decided on the choice of estimation techniques, outliers and dummies, the next
major issue that needs to be addressed is the selection of regressors. Clearly, the choice of
fundamentals could be crucial for the results. The strategy of using all potential explanatory
variables is not necessarily optimal because of the limited size of the dataset. There is
a trade-o⁄ between using potentially redundant regressors (which results in less reliable
estimates) and the risk of the omitted variable problem (which can bias estimates if the
omitted variable is correlated with the remaining regressors). We have compiled the data on
13 potential determinants, plus the time dummy, but it is possible that only a subset may be
relevant for modelling medium-term current account movements. If all possible combinations
of economic fundamentals are taken into account there are 16,384 di⁄erent models to choose
from. The ￿rst step is to examine all models to gauge if there are any common patterns. The
second step consists in selecting the best models according to four di⁄erent criteria based on
economic and/or statistical considerations. We decided to use the following criteria.
4An alternative estimation technique is the pooled mean group estimator (PMG), which uses un￿ltered
data. PMG belongs to the class of large T estimators of dynamic heterogenous panel data models, and it
involves both pooling and averaging. Unlike in the IV estimations, the short run dynamics are allowed to
be heterogenous across countries, only the level restriction given by equation (2) is imposed on the panel.
This strategy yields consistent estimates, unlike the IV or GMM techniques described above, or simple static
models. Although they are consistent, the drawback of PMG estimations is that the asymptotic guidance
is likely to be less reliable where T = 25 and there are relatively large numbers of regressors. In this case,
the number of lags needs to be severely restricted and as a result it is questionable how well the dynamic
behaviour is captured.
5See also Chinn and Prasad (2003) on why it is preferable to avoid ￿xed e⁄ects.
6Except for NFA, where we take the initial observations, as is standard in the literature.
7Criterion 1 We take all models with correctly signed regressors (for all fundamentals where there
is a theoretical prediction for the sign) or with statistically signi￿cant regressors (for
the remaining fundamentals). Finally we select the model(s) with the largest number
of variables.
Criterion 2 We take all models with statistically signi￿cant and correctly signed regressors (when
relevant) and then select the model(s) with the largest number of fundamentals.
Criterion 3 We rank all models in accordance with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This
index considers the statistical goodness of ￿t and imposes a penalty for the number of
regressors. We then select the best model.
Criterion 4 We rank all models in accordance with the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). This
index penalizes the addition of regressors more heavily than the AIC.
The ￿rst criterion minimizes the possibility of omitted variable bias, but it is likely that
the resulting model(s) will not be parsimonious, whereas the second criterion is likely to lead
to a more parsimonious speci￿cation. For these two we use the maximum available sample
size. The third and fourth criteria are purely statistical. In both cases we keep the number
of countries ￿xed at 77, which is the common sample across all variables.
3.2 Bayesian model combination
Whilst the above criteria enable us to select a small subset of preferred models, none of them
might be "true". An alternative approach is to attach prior probabilities to the di⁄erent
models and average them on the basis of the derived posterior probabilities. This is known
as Bayesian Model Averaging, which allows both model and parameter uncertainty to be
dealt with in a straightforward and formal way. Furthermore, the literature has shown that
averaging over all the models provides better average predictive ability than using a single
model.
In this paper we use the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach
as outlined by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). This approach is particularly intuitive as it
combines Bayesian techniques to derive the probability of each model with classical ordinary
least square (OLS) estimates of such models. While referring to Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004)
for the complete derivation, we brie￿ y sketch here some key features. Let us de￿ne P (Mj)
as the prior probability that Mj is the true model. The posterior probability of each model







where ly (Mj) is the likelihood of model Mj given data y and the number of candidate
regressors K.
A potentially important issue is to determine the prior probabilities of the models, P (Mj).
In contrast to a standard Bayesian approach that requires the speci￿cation of a prior dis-
tribution for all parameters, the BACE approach requires the speci￿cation of only one prior
hyper-parameter: the expected model size k. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) propose choosing
a prior mean model size, k, with each variable having a prior probability k=K of being in-
cluded.7 The posterior probability of each model Mj can then be used to simply select the
￿best￿model by choosing the one with highest posterior probability. The posterior proba-
bility of each model estimated in this way is a function of the goodness of ￿t of the model
de￿ned using a standard measure, the Schwarz criterion, and includes a degrees-of-freedom
correction to take account of the fact that models with more variables have a lower sum of
squared errors. Given that the strategy of using only the best model seems on average to
predict worse than model averaging, it is, therefore, generally preferred to use P(Mj=y) as
weights.
4 Empirical ￿ndings
Before dealing with model selection we consider the whole range of estimated models. Taking
all permutations of our 14 variables gives us 16,384 models. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of the estimated coe¢ cients for each variable whenever it appears in one of the regressions.
Although in several of these regressions the estimated coe¢ cients will not be signi￿cant, these
histograms give an idea of the uncertainty surrounding the contribution of each variable to
explaining structural current accounts, i.e. a measure of parameter uncertainty.
7Ley and Steel (2009) have shown that di⁄erences can arise from having a random rather than a ￿xed
hyper-parameter. However, using a ￿xed hyper-parameter is the standard prior used in the model averaging
literature as it is an uninformative prior that is easy to interpret, easy to specify, and easy to check for













































































































-0.6% 1.9% 4.3% 6.8% 9.5%
Asian crisis dummy
Figure 1: Histograms of coe¢ cient estimates.
10For some variables the coe¢ cients are bound in a relatively tight range (e.g. NFA from
2.4% to 4.4%), whereas others have a larger range with both positive and negative coe¢ cients.
For most variables, there is a clear tendency to either positive or negative values with a uni-
modal distribution, i.e. the sign of the coe¢ cient appears robust across almost all options.
The only variable with a distribution di⁄erent from what we expected is relative GDP growth,
where only a few models have the expected negative sign, and the vast majority have a
positive sign; this is discussed in more detail below.
After making our selection, we narrowed down the analysis to eight models. These, along
with the model average (BACE) results are presented in Table 1 (Criterion 1) and Table 2
(remaining models).
The ￿rst observation to be made on the table is that each selection criterion produces
di⁄erent models. The ￿rst selection criterion shows 5 models where (i) all variables for which
we had a prior show the correct sign, (ii) the other variables are signi￿cant, and (iii) the
requirement of having the largest number of variables (in this case 11) is met. With the
second selection criterion, which also foresees all variables being signi￿cant, the maximum
number of variables in a regression meeting these requirements is 8, and only one model
is feasible. For these two criteria, the number of countries modeled ranged from 77 to 99,
re￿ ecting the maximum country availability given the data. For the next two criteria and
the BACE method, the span of the time series was kept constant at the common sample
of 77 countries to enable model comparability. Under the third selection method, the AIC
based criterion, a model with 11 variables was chosen, whereas for the fourth, the Schwarz
criterion, only 4 variables were selected. This is in line with the theory, whereby the AIC
criterion assigns a smaller penalty to the number of regressors than the Schwarz criterion.
Nonetheless, the AIC-based model is notable in that the regression selected has 11 variables
and most of the signs are consistent with our priors.
Examination of the variables selected using the 4 di⁄erent criteria reveals that NFA is
selected in all reported speci￿cations, with a tightly bound coe¢ cient ranging from 0.025
to 0.031, and is in all cases highly signi￿cant. Another variable to feature in almost all
regressions is the oil balance, where the coe¢ cient ranges from 0.083 to 0.158. The coe¢ cient
estimate for relative income ranges between 0.007 and 0.039. As the textbooks suggest, all
other things being equal countries in the early stages of development should be greater
recipients of capital. In the panel current account literature, however, the sign is often
counter-intuitive or, as in our case, small (Rahman, 2008, IMF 2006, Chinn and Prasad,
2003).8 The fact that economic growth does not feature in any of the regressions other than
that selected using the AIC-based criterion is of particular relevance. The reason becomes
8This is in line with the Lucas paradox, which holds that capital does not ￿ ow from the "rich" to the
"poor"; see discussion in Reinhard and Rogo⁄ (2004).
11Table 1: Fundamentals and estimated elasticities for the selected models under
Criterion 1 (m = 12).
Criterion 1
No of variables: 11 11 11 11 11
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Initial NFA 0.029 0.031 0.025 0.026 0.030
(5.8) (6.7) (3.9) (4.4) (6.3)
Oil balance 0.083 0.128 0.099 0.137
(1.4) (1.8) (2.2) (2.0)
Investment -0.091 -0.111 -0.027 -0.041 -0.061
(-1.5) (-1.8) (-0.5) (-0.7) (-0.9)
Economic growth
Fiscal balance 0.159 0.214 0.171
(1.7) (2.5) (1.9)
Relative income 0.033 0.007 0.018 0.028 0.016
(3.5) (1.4) (2.1) (3.4) (1.9)
Population growth -1.387 -0.931 -1.198 -1.164 -0.895
(-2.6) (-1.6) (-2.5) (-2.5) (-1.7)
Civil liberties 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005
(2.9) (2.1) (1.3) (2.3)
Openness 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.016
(2.1) (2.4) (2.4) (2.6)
Financial. integration -0.002 -0.002
(-2.4) (-2.0)
Dependency ratio (old) -0.329 -0.192 -0.280 -0.329
(-3.9) (-2.6) (-3.4) (-4.1)
Dependency ratio (young) -0.036 -0.058 -0.038 -0.036 -0.022
(-1.4) (-2.3) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-0.8)
Relative income squared 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005
(2.9) (2.8) (3.7) (2.1)
Asian crisis dummy 0.038 0.033 0.012 0.015 0.035
(2.0) (1.6) (0.6) (0.8) (1.8)
No of countries 77 77 98 99 77
No of observations 1925 1925 2450 2475 1925
Data shrinkage 154 154 196 198 154
Adjusted R2 59.0 56.9 45.4 43.6 56.9
Notes: Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the non-overlapping 12-year moving averages. Robust t-ratios are
reported in parentheses.
12Table 2: Fundamentals and estimated elasticities for the selected models under
Criterion 2-4 and BACE (m = 12).
Criterion. 2 Criterion. 3 Criterion. 4 BACE
No of variables (or prior): 8 11 4 5
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Initial NFA 0.025 0.030 0.031 0.033
(4.1) (6.4) (5.9) (6.3)
Oil balance 0.096 0.089 0.158 0.164
(2.1) (1.3) (3.4) (2.6)
Investment -0.091 -0.022
(-1.3) (-0.3)




Relative income 0.022 0.039 0.022
(2.7) (5.8) (1.0)
Population growth -1.522 -1.539 -1.052
(-3.6) (-3.9) (-1.2)
Civil liberties 0.006 0.007
(2.9) (1.0)
Openness 0.020 0.019 0.021
(2.7) (3.7) (1.8)
Financial integration -0.002 0.004 0.004
(-2.4) (1.7) (0.8)
Dependency ratio (old) -0.254 -0.329 -0.199
(-3.4) (-4.0) (-0.9)
Dependency ratio (young) -0.053 -0.058
(-4.1) (-1.7)
Relative income squared 0.006 0.010 0.007
(3.0) (4.3) (1.0)
Asian crisis dummy 0.035 0.054
(1.7) (1.1)
No of countries 99 77 77 77
No. of observations 2475 1925 1925 1925
Data shrinkage 198 154 154 154
Adjusted R2 44.6 60.3 50.3 -
Notes: Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the non-overlapping 12-year moving averages. Robust t-ratios are
reported in parentheses. BACE results are for a prior of inclusion of 5 variables and the elasticities reported are conditional on
the variable being included.
13clear from the histogram, which shows that for nearly all the regressions economic growth
comes up with a positive sign. There is thus little empirical support that strong growth
is associated with current account de￿cits. By contrast, openness, the sign for which was
considered to be ambiguous, has a positive coe¢ cient in all six models where it appears.
Fiscal balance, relative income, civil liberties and the demographic variables are always
selected with the correct sign, featuring to a greater or lesser extent in all eight selected
models.
Turning to the remaining variables, both ￿nancial integration and investment have limited
explanatory power, the former appearing in four of the selected regressors but with a small
coe¢ cient, while the latter is never signi￿cant. For relative income squared we did not have
a clear-cut expectation about the sign ex-ante. Whilst the distribution was centred around
zero, in the selected models where it appears the sign is positive. The dummy for the Asian
crisis proves to be signi￿cant in almost all models and the coe¢ cient is always positive.
It is also noteworthy that none of the coe¢ cients in these models are at the extremes of
the distributions in Figure 1,9 and that the estimates are in line with other estimates in the
literature.10
The analysis carried out so far suggests there are a number of models that could be
selected to provide current account benchmarks, and our results provide some measure of
the uncertainty surrounding the estimates. Rather than focusing on one or two models which
might be mis-speci￿ed, the alternative is to carry out a model combination exercise which
takes advantage of the full range of possible models. The last column of Table 2 reports the
BACE results for the case of a hyper-prior of 5 variables. The coe¢ cients and t-statistics
are the posterior mean and standard deviations conditional on the variable being included in
the regression; these coe¢ cients can therefore be considered comparable to the coe¢ cients
from the single regressions (Models 1 to 8). The coe¢ cients for the BACE are similar to the
range of coe¢ cients in Models 1 to 8, with NFA and oil balance being the only coe¢ cients
with t-statistics greater than or equal to 2.
4.1 Sensitivity analysis of level elasticities
To check the sensitivity of our analysis we look at the level elasticitites derived using BACE
by (i) varying the temporal aggregation window, (ii) considering an alternative selection of
countries and (iii) expanding the set of plausible fundamentals.
Table 3 shows that the BACE estimation results are broadly robust to di⁄erent temporal
aggregation windows. In particular the coe¢ cient for NFA is in the narrow range between
9Similar conclusions would be reached if the histograms were presented in terms of common rather than
maximum available sample.
10For an overview of the results of other main studies see Table 2 in Rahman (2008).
140.033 and 0.036 for m ￿ 12, although it is considerably higher for m = 25. The range is
relatively contained for the other signi￿cant variable, namely oil balance, for which the coef-
￿cient is between 0.1 and 0.16. For most other variables the coe¢ cients are not signi￿cant.
For temporal aggregation windows of 1 or 4 periods, investment and ￿scal balance have
greater explanatory power; this would appear to be intuitive as these fundamentals play a
larger role in short term horizons.
The issue of homogeneity of elasticities across di⁄erent grouping of countries is also
frequently discussed in the literature. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the robustness of
BACE results to di⁄erent samples excluding G7, Latin America, emerging Asia, the Middle
East and euro area countries. In most cases the results are similar, although the analysis
appears to be more sensitive to the exclusion of the Middle East. Table A.3 in the Appendix
also demonstrates the robustness of the BACE results to splitting the sample approximately
into two halves, either between high and low-income countries or between countries with
high and low NFA positions. We discuss later to what extent this has an impact on the
assessment of global imbalances.
Ley and Steel (2009) have also shown that results could be sensitive to alternative hyper-
priors. We report, in Appendix B, the posterior probabilities of including variables across
the full set of hyper-priors. NFA positions and the oil balance remain the key variables, and
the main thrust of our analysis on imbalances is unchanged.
Finally, even if we adopted a comprehensive approach consistent with thousands of mod-
els, the set of macroeconomic variables could still be further expanded. The initial choice of
variables to be included in the analysis was based on our reading of the literature on the key
determinants of the current account over the medium-term horizon. Additional variables
could be nonetheless envisaged beyond those considered above; however, this would come
at the cost of a reduced sample size as data is not available for all countries. To check the
sensitivity of including an extended set of regressors, we added 8 variables.
￿ Real e⁄ective exchange rate. Price competitiveness plays an important role in
explaining short-run current account transactions. It is, however, not included as
a medium-term determinant of current account benchmarks in IMF (2006) and is
generally not included for m > 4. In fundamental equilibrium exchange rate models
the price competitiveness channel is perceived as playing a pivotal role in bringing
cycle-adjusted current account positions back to the benchmarks (BussiŁre et al, 2010).
￿ Chinn-Ito index. As capital controls are eased, external ￿nancing may support
current account de￿cits (Chinn and Prasad, 2003, and De Santis and L￿hrmann, 2008).
In this paper we rely on a measure of ￿nancial openness developed recently by Chinn
and Ito (2008).
15Table 3: Robustness of BACE estimation results to di⁄erent temporal aggrega-
tion windows.
Temporal aggregation window
m = 1 m = 4 m = 12 m = 25
Initial NFA 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.063
(8.5) (6.8) (6.3) (3.5)
Oil balance 0.133 0.127 0.164 0.100
(3.1) (2.7) (2.6) (1.2)
Investment -0.167 -0.129 -0.022 0.001
(-4.9) (-3.1) (-0.31) (0.0)
Economic growth -0.043 0.033 0.404 0.141
(-0.8) (0.3) (1.1) (0.6)
Fiscal balance 0.252 0.261 0.242 0.211
(4.7) (4.2) (1.1) (1.1)
Relative income -0.003 0.000 0.022 0.004
(-0.5) (0.1) (1.0) (0.4)
Population growth -0.493 -0.722 -1.052 -0.134
(-3.1) (-1.2) (-1.2) (-0.3)
Civil liberties 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.000
(1.1) (0.8) (1.0) (0.2)
Openness 0.018 0.016 0.021 0.013
(3.3) (3.0) (1.8) (1.1)
Financial integration 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000
(-0.1) (0.5) (0.8) (0.2)
Dependency ratio (old) -0.121 -0.151 -0.199 -0.062
(-1.9) (-1.2) (-0.9) (-0.5)
Dependency ratio (young) -0.053 -0.057 -0.058 -0.018
(-2.8) (-2.1) (-1.7) (-0.5)
Relative income squared 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.000
(0.8) (0.7) (1.0) (0.1)
Asian crisis dummy 0.048 0.048 0.054 0.007
(3.6) (3.1) (1.1) (0.3)
No of countries 77 77 77 77
No of observations 1925 1925 1925 1925
Data shrinkage 1925 462 154 77
Notes: Pooled ordinary least squares estimation on the non-overlapping m-year moving averages. Robust t-ratios are reported
in parentheses. BACE results are for a prior of inclusion of 5 variables and the elasticities reported are conditional on the
variable being included.
16￿ Financial sector reform. Financial reforms help relax borrowing constraints a⁄ect-
ing savings. We use the measure developed by Abiad et al. (2008), which aggregates
several di⁄erent indicators of ￿nancial sector policy. We prefer this measure to alterna-
tive ￿nancial deepening measures, as it is broadly based and has better cross-country
comparability.
￿ Capital gains. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and others have suggested that valuation
e⁄ects play an important role as price and exchange rate ￿ uctuations lead to sizable
volatility in wealth, especially in the short-run. While the literature has discussed
extensively whether the United States enjoys an exorbitant privilege and could a⁄ord
larger current account and trade de￿cits over the medium-term (e.g. Eichengreen 2006,
Gourinchas and Rey 2007, Gourinchas 2008, Gourinchas et al 2010), the issue might
be relevant for other countries and globally (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005a, 2005b,
Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2007, Habib, 2010).11 We included capital gains for the
broad range of countries in our sample using the decomposition proposed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2005b).12
￿ Terms of trade. The current account performance of a country may also be a⁄ected
by the ratio of export to import prices (Chinn and Prasad, 2003).
￿ Deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). A rise in foreign exchange
premia signals higher external ￿nancing costs, which may have repercussions for the
current account (De Santis and L￿hrmann, 2008).
￿ Financial center dummy. Financial centers generally have strong creditor positions
and current account surpluses. We set the dummy equal to 1 for the same countries as
in IMF (2006). The exclusion of the United Kingdom (which does not ￿t this intuition)
could be seen as arbitrary, however.
￿ Banking crisis dummy. As discussed in IMF (2006), banking crises a⁄ect the ability
of a country to ￿nance external de￿cits. We set the dummy equal to 1 in the year of
the crisis and the two following years, assuming that full access to capital markets is
resumed thereafter. The dating of the crises comes from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
11The theoretical links and normative interpretations are not trivial. While higher capital gains from
foreign holdings (relative to domestic) help stabilize the stock of external debt, they could also re￿ ect a
structural weakness of the economy (Eichengreen, 2006) or a large exposure to asset-liability mismatch risk
in times of ￿nancial turbulence (Gourinchas et al, 2010).
12Capital gains were on average over the sample 1980-2007 found to be over 1% of GDP for the United
States and close to zero for the United Kingdom, Japan and China. Although severely a⁄ected by measura-
ment error and potentially capturing other factors, such as debt restructuring, we tested the implications of
including/excluding this variable from the baseline and from the extended set of regressors; we found that
the main thrust of the analysis remains unchanged. Future research may, however, be warranted to further
assess the role of valuation e⁄ects at the global level and not just for the United States.
17The "cost" of having such an extended set of regressors is a signi￿cant drop in the
common sample size, from 77 countries in the baseline to 36 countries, while the number
of feasible model combinations rises to over 4 million. The loss of observations and the rise
in model uncertainty lead to a signi￿cant drop in t-values (Table A.3). As discussed later,
however, this does not prevent us from reaching clear-cut conclusions on the current account
constellation prevailing before the crisis.
5 Implications for Global Imbalances
We apply the main implications of our results to four major economies, namely the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the People￿ s Republic of China. We start with a
snapshot of current account benchmarks in 2007 by considering all possible models with
m = 12 derived from the baseline set of regressors. The vast majority of models suggest
that current account de￿cits should be expected for the United States, the United Kingdom
and Japan. According to the peaks in the distributions, these de￿cits should be close to 3%
of GDP for the United States while lower values of about 1.5 and 2% of GDP are found for
the United Kingdom and Japan respectively (Figure 2, upper panel). In the case of China,
a large number of models point to current account surpluses of between 1.5 and 3% of GDP,
even if there are a few models consistent with relatively large de￿cits.
A second set of histograms is derived by using the extended sample of regressors (Figure
2, lower panel). Although re￿ ecting millions of models and a smaller country coverage, the
peaks still point to a moderate de￿cit in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan
and to a moderate surplus in China.
To gauge the evolution of global imbalances we refer to the three econometric strategies
outlined earlier, that is to (i) examine where the large majority of models are clustered, (ii)
select a speci￿c model, and (iii) apply model averaging using BACE. We only report the
results for the baseline as those for the extended sample are entirely analogous.
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Figure 2: Current account benchmarks in 2007.
The ￿rst approach is to derive current account benchmarks from all models and compare
them to actual current account realizations (Figure 3). Obviously, this approach cannot
always reach univocal conclusions, particularly as some of the models could be mis-speci￿ed.
However, as the implied current account benchmarks between the 10% and 90% quantiles
are located within a relatively narrow range, a clear story emerges. Almost all the models
suggest that prior to the ￿nancial crisis the increase in current account de￿cits in the United
19States and the United Kingdom and the growing surpluses in Japan and China could not
easily be reconciled with the evolution of economic fundamentals. However, towards the end
of the forecast horizon this conclusion is less clear-cut for the United States and the United
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Figure 3: Current account benchmarks
The second approach ￿looking at a particular selected model ￿allows one to quantify
the extent of the imbalances. In Figure 3 we plot the benchmark based on the Schwarz
(SBC) criterion (model 8). This model suggest that current accounts were not aligned with
fundamentals in the global economy in 2007, with imbalances of around 10% for China, 5%
for the United States, and slightly less for the United Kingdom and Japan.
The third approach to analyzing imbalances is to rely on model combination techniques,
such as BACE, which uses the information content of all models but weights them on the
basis of their statistical properties. This approach avoids the danger of drawing too many
conclusions on the basis of one speci￿c and potentially mis-speci￿ed model. As shown in
Figure 3, the BACE current account benchmark14 is always contained in the min-max bounds
across the 25% and 75% quantiles but is not necessarily close to the middle point. It signals
13We take the WEO September 2008 set of projections for both the current account and all available
fundamentals; we assume unchanged fundamentals for the remaining variables.
14The unconditional coe¢ cients of the BACE model are derived by rescaling the conditional coe¢ cients
using the probabilities in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
20that in 2007 there were large imbalances in all four countries of interest. By the end of
the forecast horizon, this benchmark suggests that imbalances would narrow for the United
States and the United Kingdom but not for China and Japan.
The analysis is then taken one step forward by calculating the probability that the current
account position of any given country is misaligned, see Table 4.15 For the baseline the
results are clear cut. The probability that current account de￿cits were too large in 2007
is, depending on the temporal aggregation window, between 70% and 93% for the United
States and between 63% to 81% for the United Kingdom. Similarly, the probability of current
account surpluses in China and Japan being above the 2007 benchmarks is over 95% for all
temporal aggregations.
Table 4: Probabilities of misalignment
2007 2013
m=1 m=4 m=12 m=25 m=12
P(CA de￿cit < benchmark)
United States 0.70 0.75 0.93 0.80 0.71
United Kingdom 0.63 0.65 0.81 0.67 0.57
P(CA surplus > benchmark)
Japan 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.95
People￿ s Republic of China 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.96
The combined information content from this modelling approach and the WEO forecast
database point to a likely persistence of current account imbalances in Japan and China in
2013, while the evidence for the United States and the United Kingdom (Table 4) is weaker.
We ￿nally consider to what extent these conclusions concerning current account imbal-
ances are robust to the sensitivity analysis we conducted earlier. By splitting the baseline
into two subsamples, either by income or NFA levels, our general assessment for any of the
four countries does not change (Table 5). Taking the extended model ￿which reduces the
sample of countries to 36 and increases the number of models from over 16,000 to more than
4 million ￿provides further evidence that current account surpluses were too large in Japan
and China in 2007; the evidence of a misalignment is less strong in the case of the United
States and the United Kingdom.
15This is achieved with the following two step procedure. First, conditional on each model being the
"true" model, we derive the probability that the current account exceeds its ￿tted value, namely that
P(cait > b cait=y;Mj). Using Bayes￿rule, the probability that the current account exceeds its ￿tted value,
considering model uncertainty, is P(cait > b cait=y) =
P2
K
j=1 P(Mj=y)P(cait > b cait=y;Mj).
21Table 5: Probabilities of misalignment in 2007, sensitivity analysis
Regressors Standard set Extended set
(14 variables) (22 variables)
Country sample: 77 Split by income Split by NFA 36
P(CA de￿cit < benchmark)
United States 0.93 0.73 0.94 0.87
United Kingdom 0.81 0.88 0.92 0.73
P(CA surplus > benchmark)
Japan 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96
People￿ s Republic of China 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.99
Note: For m=12.
6 Concluding Remarks
Current account imbalances are said to have been an important root cause of the global
￿nancial turmoil. This paper has shown that there are thousands, if not millions, of models,
which may lead to di⁄erent conclusions on whether disequilibria exist and their size. To
reach policy conclusions we explored di⁄erent routes, corresponding to three alternative
plausible econometric strategies: examining all models, selecting a few, and combining them
all. Whether we take the cluster where the largest number of models can be found, select the
best model according to both statistical and economic criteria, or combine all models, the
same conclusion can be reached: current account imbalances prevailed in all four countries
(the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and China) prior to the crisis. Although
models could be selected that result in di⁄erent benchmarks, one has to assess how likely it
is that they are mis-speci￿ed. We have therefore turned the analysis into a single probability
statement, which accounts for both the likelihood of models being "true" and estimation
uncertainty. Out of thousands/millions of models, one consistent story emerges. The chance
that current accounts were aligned with fundamentals prior to the ￿nancial crisis appears to
be, according to this approach, minimal.
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26A Additional tables
Table A.1: Data description
Deviation
from trading
Variable partners Source Description
Initial NFA no L-MF Net foreign assets as a share of GDP at the end of the previous year.
Oil balance no WEO Oil trade balance as a share of GDP.
Investments yes WEO Gross ￿xed investments as a share of GDP.
Economic growth yes WEO Real GDP growth.
Fiscal balance yes WEO Fiscal de￿cit as a share of GDP.
Relative income yes WEO Real GDP per capita in PPP terms, US $.
Population growth yes WEO Annual growth of total population.
Civil liberties yes FWS Index between 1 (free) and 7 (not free).
Openness yes WEO Sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
Financial integration yes L-MF Sum of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP.
Dependency ratio (old) yes WDI Ratio of older people (>64 years) to middle-age (15-64) cohort.
Dependency ratio (young) yes WDI Ratio of young people (<15 years) to middle-age (15-64) cohort.
Asian crisis dummy yes IMF(2006) Equal to one from 1998 in all Asian countries.
Current account no WEO Current account as a share of GDP.
Real e⁄ective exchange rate no WEO Trade-weighted real e⁄. exch. rate based on PPP price indices.
Chinn-Ito index yes C-I Index, measuring ￿nancial openness.
Financial sector reform yes A-D-T Index, measuring ￿nancial liberalization.
Terms of trade no WEO Index, price of exports / price of imports, goods.
Deviation from UIP no IFS, WEO Short-term interest rate di⁄erential minus one-year lead
depreciation gap.
Financial center dummy yes IMF (2006) Equal to one for countries selected as ￿nancial centres.
Capital gains yes L-MF, WEO Equation 4 in Ca￿Zorzi et al. (2011); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005b)
Banking crisis dummy yes L-V Equal to one in crisis year and the two following years.
Country-speci￿c trade weights DOTS Average bilateral trade ￿ows during the period 1996-2000 for all coun-
tries in the database are used to construct the trade weights matrix.
Notes: L-MF is updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), C-I stands for Chinn
and Ito (2008), A-D-T for Abiad et al. (2008), L-V for Laeven and Valencia (2008); WEO is September 2008 version of IMF
World Economic Outlook database, WDI is 2007 version of WB World Development Indicators database, FWS refers to annual
Freedom in the World survey and DOTS is IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database.
27Table A.2: Robustness of BACE results to di⁄erent samples.
Sample excludes:
G7 Lat. Am. Em. Asia Middle East Africa Euro Area
Initial NFA 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.036 0.031 0.032
(5.5) (2.7) (6.6) (8.3) (5.2) (5.9)
Oil balance 0.142 0.140 0.171 0.279 0.162 0.142
(1.6) (1.6) (2.3) (3.1) (2.5) (1.7)
Investment -0.082 0.050 -0.054 -0.143 -0.100 -0.034
(-0.8) (0.7) (-0.6) (-1.7) (-0.8) (-0.4)
Economic growth 0.387 0.286 0.379 0.395 0.340 0.379
(1.3) (1.0) (1.1) (1.7) (1.0) (1.3)
Fiscal balance 0.198 0.234 0.148 0.312 0.286 0.188
(1.0) (1.3) (1.0) (2.8) (1.5) (1.0)
Relative income 0.038 0.034 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.030
(2.3) (1.8) (1.0) (0.8) (1.0) (1.6)
Population growth -1.402 -1.128 -0.944 -1.610 -0.728 -1.135
(-1.7) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-2.2) (-0.9) (-1.2)
Civil liberties 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.007
(1.3) (1.4) (1.1) (0.8) (0.6) (1.3)
Openness 0.018 0.014 0.011 0.021 0.020 0.018
(1.2) (1.0) (0.8) (2.9) (2.2) (1.4)
Financial integration 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.9) (1.0) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (0.7)
Dependency ratio (old) -0.321 -0.264 -0.116 -0.172 -0.061 -0.266
(-1.9) (-1.6) (-0.7) (-1.0) (-0.4) (-1.4)
Dependency ratio (young) -0.052 -0.064 -0.051 -0.042 -0.061 -0.061
(-1.0) (-1.4) (-1.3) (-0.8) (-1.5) (-1.3)
Relative income squared 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.008
(2.3) (1.8) (1.0) (1.1) (1.1) (1.6)
Asian crisis dummy 0.059 0.058 -0.010 0.048 0.066 0.052
(1.8) (1.9) (-0.2) (1.3) (2.0) (1.4)
No of countries 70 66 64 68 58 64
No of observations 1750 1650 1600 1700 1450 1600
Data shrinkage 140 132 128 136 116 128
Notes: Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the non-overlapping 12-year moving averages. Robust t-ratios are
reported in parentheses. BACE results are for a prior of inclusions of 5 variables and the elasticities reported are conditional
on the variable being included.
28Table A.3: Robustness of BACE results to di⁄erent grouping / extra variables.
High inc. Low inc. High NFA Low NFA Extended
countries countries countries countries set of regressors
Initial NFA 0.030 0.029 0.017 0.031 0.025
(1.6) (7.6) (0.8) (10.4) (0.95)
Oil balance 0.157 0.218 0.167 0.267 0.254
(1.7) (2.7) (2.3) (2.7) (1.14)
Investment 0.224 -0.101 0.095 -0.188 -0.057
(1.0) (-1.1) (0.8) (-1.9) (-0.55)
Economic growth -0.034 0.408 0.024 0.621 0.112
(-0.1) (1.4) (0.1) (2.3) (0.31)
Fiscal balance 0.130 0.093 0.166 0.305 0.110
(0.7) (0.6) (1.0) (1.3) (0.95)
Relative income 0.035 0.007 0.029 0.011 0.006
(2.6) (0.6) (1.2) (1.0) (0.43)
Population growth -0.528 -1.743 -0.308 -1.689 -0.128
(-0.7) (-2.4) (-0.4) (-1.4) (-0.20)
Civil liberties 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.003
(1.1) (0.9) (1.2) (0.7) (0.85)
Openness 0.012 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.007
(0.8) (0.2) (1.3) (0.3) (0.61)
Financial integration 0.008 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000
(2.2) (0.0) (1.3) (0.1) (0.12)
Dependency ratio (old) 0.036 -0.405 -0.174 -0.334 -0.033
(0.2) (-3.1) (-1.0) (-2.5) (-0.34)
Dependency ratio (young) -0.043 -0.063 -0.105 -0.042 -0.033
(-0.6) (-1.0) (-2.8) (-0.7) (-0.52)
Relative income squared 0.011 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 -0.000
(0.7) (-0.2) (1.3) (-0.6) (-0.08)
Asian crisis dummy 0.107 0.028 0.053 0.037 0.041
(2.4) (0.9) (1.2) (0.9) (0.40)




Financial sector reform 0.001
(0.12)
Terms of trade 0.001
(0.03)




Financial sector dummy 0.030
(1.40)
Banking crisis dummy -0.000
(-0.04)
No of countries 34 43 40 37 36
No of observations 850 1075 1000 925 900
Data shrinkage 68 86 80 74 72
Notes: Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the non-overlapping 12-year moving averages. Robust t-ratios are
reported in parentheses. BACE results are for a prior of inclusions of 5 variables and the elasticities reported are conditional
on the variable being included.
29B Implications of alternative model size priors
Ley and Steel (2009) have shown that di⁄erences can arise, in the BACE approach, from di⁄erent
￿xed hyper-parameters (model size priors). As the maximum model size is small relative to other
examples of model averaging we are able to examine the robustness of our conclusions with respect
to this hyper-parameter by considering all possible model sizes, i.e. from 1 to 13 variables, thus
directly addressing the criticism of Ley and Steel (2009). An appealing way of presenting the
results is Table B.1, which reports the posterior and prior probabilities of inclusion of variable for
alternative hyper-parameters k = 1;::;13. This table shows that NFA has a very high probability
of inclusion in all cases. In addition, for three variables the posterior probability of inclusion is
higher than the prior probability for all k, namely relative income, old-age dependency ratio and
relative income squared.
Table B.1: Posterior and prior inclusion probabilities
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Prior probabilities 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.79 0.86 0.93
(for each variable)
Variable Posterior probabilities
Initial NFA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Oil balance 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.76
Investments 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.53
Economic growth 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.65
Fiscal balance 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.33
Relative income 0.16 0.25 0.36 0.46 0.56 0.65 0.73 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.98
Population growth 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.37 0.44 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.92
Civil liberties 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.73
Openness 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.38
Financial int. 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.50
Dependency ratio (old) 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.53 0.62 0.70 0.76 0.82 0.87 0.91 0.95
Dependency ratio (young) 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24
Relative income squared 0.11 0.22 0.34 0.45 0.56 0.65 0.73 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.98
Asian crisis dummy 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.39 0.45 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.79 0.83
Notes: Posterior probabilities larger then the corresponding prior probabilities are highlighted by bold font.
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